Where the math is defensible.
Long-form research on live enterprise decisions. Publication is selective. Every number traces to a named source. No takes without evidence.
Africa's 2026 Sovereign Restructuring Cycle: Common Framework Outcomes, China Bilateral Geometry, and IMF Program Design
Six African sovereigns defaulted between 2020 and 2024. Zambia, Ghana, Chad, and Ethiopia have now closed Eurobond and bilateral deals. The pipeline runs through Egypt, Angola, Tunisia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal, while 21 Sub Saharan countries are in active IMF programs and external debt service hits roughly USD 100 billion in 2025 and 2026.
Africa's external Eurobond stock peaked near USD 145 billion in 2021 and stood at roughly USD 140 billion at end 2024, per S&P Global Ratings. Six issuers defaulted across 2020 to 2024: Zambia, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique on the Tuna Bond, and Mali on regional debt. The G20 Common Framework, launched in November 2020, has now produc...
Antimicrobial Resistance in Sub-Saharan Africa 2026: Surveillance Gaps and Financing Arithmetic
Sub-Saharan Africa carries the highest per-capita AMR burden on the planet, yet captures the smallest share of surveillance, diagnostics, and stewardship finance. This brief sets out the arithmetic of closing that gap by 2030.
Sub-Saharan Africa carries the world's highest age-standardized mortality from bacterial antimicrobial resistance, with an estimated 1.05 million deaths attributable or associated with resistant infections each year. Yet the region contributes less than 9 percent of records in the WHO GLASS dataset, finances roughly 12 percent of the diag...
Cobalt 2026: the DRC chokepoint, the Indonesian flood, and a price floor that has not held
Seventy percent of mined cobalt comes out of one country, three quarters of refining sits in another, and the price has fallen by two thirds since 2022. The chokepoint did not disappear. It moved.
Cobalt entered 2026 as the most concentrated battery metal in the world and the worst priced. The Democratic Republic of the Congo produced roughly 70 percent of mined supply in 2024, China refined about three quarters of the global total, and prices fell from above 80,000 US dollars per tonne in 2022 to a 24,000 to 30,000 corridor across...
Cocoa 2024 to 2026: West African Collapse, Price Shock, and the EUDR Reset
ICE cocoa futures printed an all time high above USD 12,500 per tonne in April 2024, then settled into a USD 7,000 to 9,000 range through Q1 2026. Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, together roughly 60 percent of world supply, are still under disease, climate, and galamsey stress, and the chocolate platform is repricing through the entire value chain.
World cocoa output fell to roughly 4.4 million tonnes in 2023 to 2024 from a 5.0 million tonne plateau, with Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana driving more than 80 percent of the shortfall. Black pod disease, cocoa swollen shoot virus disease, El Nino dryness, and the rapid encroachment of artisanal gold mining (galamsey) onto Ghanaian cocoa land c...
DRC, Rwanda, and the M23 Conflict in 2026: East Congo Mineral Economics, Sanctions Geometry, and Battery Supply Chain Exposure
M23 captured Goma in January 2025 and Bukavu in March 2025, with the UN Group of Experts documenting roughly 4,000 Rwanda Defence Force personnel embedded with the militia. The DRC produces about 73 percent of mined cobalt and roughly 40 percent of mined tantalum globally, per USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025. The conflict, the OFAC and EU Council sanctions cycle, and the Trump March 2025 minerals for security framework now sit on top of the EV battery supply chain.
The Mouvement du 23 Mars resumed operations in November 2021 in North Kivu after a nine year dormancy following its 2013 defeat. By late January 2025 M23 had taken Goma, capital of North Kivu and a city of roughly two million, and on February 16, 2025 it captured Bukavu, capital of South Kivu. The Forces Armees de la Republique Democratiq...
Egypt 2026: Nile Water Security after GERD Completion, the Entebbe Pivot, and the Food Import Question
Ethiopia completed the fifth GERD filling in August 2024 and declared the project finished in September. With Burundi's October 2024 ratification of the Cooperative Framework Agreement, the legal and hydrological status quo behind Egypt's Nile rights is, in practice, gone.
Egypt's Nile question has shifted from a negotiation problem to an operating problem. GERD was declared complete by Ethiopia on 3 September 2024 after the fifth reservoir filling, with four of thirteen turbines online by April 2026 toward a 6.45 GW installed capacity. African Union mediation collapsed in late 2023. The Cooperative Framewo...
Ethiopia 2026: Tigray reintegration, GERD power, and the birr float
The Pretoria peace, GERD's six turbine commissioning, and the July 2024 birr float reset Ethiopia's macro and political map. Eurobond restructuring, IMF EFF execution, and the Somaliland MoU determine whether the stabilization holds through 2027.
Ethiopia entered 2026 with three simultaneous reset clocks. The November 2, 2022 Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement formally ended the Tigray war, but TPLF disarmament, federal force redeployment, and the contested western Tigray districts remain partially unsettled. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam reached full reservoir fill...
Ghana 2026: Cocoa Collapse, IMF Stabilization, and the Mahama Reset
Ghana exits 2025 with a halved cocoa crop, a restructured Eurobond stack, and a new Mahama administration. The 2026 question is whether disinflation, gold receipts, and ECF discipline can outrun the structural decay at COCOBOD.
Ghana entered the IMF Extended Credit Facility in May 2023 with USD 3 billion over 36 months, restructured domestic debt under the DDEP, and swapped USD 13 billion of Eurobonds in October 2024. Cocoa output collapsed from a 2020-21 peak of 1.05 million tonnes to roughly 430,000 tonnes in 2023-24 per ICCO, driven by swollen shoot virus, ga...
Haiti Under Gang Rule, Kenya MSS, and the Failed Stabilisation Trade
Port-au-Prince has fallen to roughly 80 percent gang control, the Kenya led Multinational Security Support mission stalled at about 1,300 personnel against a 2,500 ceiling, and humanitarian collapse now defines policy choice across CARICOM, the OAS, and the United States.
Haiti's 2024 to 2026 trajectory describes the worst Western Hemisphere security collapse since the Cold War. The Viv Ansanm gang coalition led by Jimmy Cherizier (Barbecue) launched a coordinated offensive in March 2024, seized the National Penitentiary, and forced Prime Minister Ariel Henry to announce resignation on March 11, 2024. A ni...
JETP at the inflection: Indonesia, Vietnam, South Africa, Senegal through 2026
Four Just Energy Transition Partnerships now total roughly USD 46.7 billion in announced public and private commitments. The South Africa JET-IP needs USD 98 billion, Indonesia's CIPP needs USD 97.3 billion, and the US tranche has been frozen since the Trump withdrawal from Paris in January 2025. The IPG arithmetic for COP30 has shifted.
The Just Energy Transition Partnerships announced between November 2021 (South Africa, COP26) and June 2023 (Senegal, Paris Summit for a New Global Financing Pact) cumulatively pledged about USD 46.7 billion in concessional public and mobilized private capital across South Africa (USD 8.5 billion initial, raised to USD 13.8 billion at COP...
Kenya health financing 2026: SHIF rollout, fiscal arithmetic, donor cliff
The Social Health Insurance Fund inherits NHIF's debts and Kenya's universal coverage ambitions just as PEPFAR, Global Fund, and Gavi rewrite the rules of co-financing. The arithmetic is brutal, but tractable.
Kenya replaced the National Hospital Insurance Fund with the Social Health Insurance Fund in October 2024, anchoring universal coverage on a 2.75 percent salary deduction and a means tested contribution for informal workers. Eighteen months later, enrollment has climbed past 22 million principal members, but only a fraction are paying. Pr...
Kenya After the Finance Bill: Gen Z Veto, Ruto Reset, and the Macroeconomic Adjustment
The June 2024 Finance Bill protests forced President Ruto to withdraw a KES 346 billion tax package, reshape the cabinet, and reopen a fiscal hole that the IMF Extended Fund Facility, a USD 1.5 billion Eurobond at 10.375 percent, and a CBK easing cycle from 13.00 to 11.25 percent have only partially closed.
Between June 18 and June 25, 2024 a self organized Gen Z movement turned the Finance Bill 2024 into a constitutional crisis. Parliament was breached on June 25, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights logged at least 60 deaths, and on June 26 William Ruto withdrew the bill, vetoing his own KES 346.7 billion revenue plan. The fiscal ...
Kenya After the Bill: Ruto, the Gen Z Revolt, and the IMF Reset
After Gen Z protesters stormed Parliament and forced withdrawal of the Finance Bill 2024, the Ruto administration is governing through a renegotiated IMF program, a narrower Finance Act 2025, and cancelled Adani concessions, betting that a softer anchor and stronger shilling buy room to 2027.
On June 25, 2024, protesters breached the Kenyan Parliament after the National Assembly passed the Finance Bill 2024. President Ruto withdrew it on June 26 and dismissed almost the entire Cabinet on July 11. The roughly 346 billion shilling hole was filled through a supplementary budget and a renegotiated IMF EFF and ECF totaling about 3....
Lagos Crude: Dangote Refinery and the Atlantic Basin Gasoline Reordering Through 2026
Africa's largest refinery is rewriting the Atlantic Basin gasoline map. The 2026 to 2027 question is whether the naira-denominated crude template, NNPCL flotation, and pump price normalization can hold.
The Dangote Petroleum Refinery in the Lekki Free Zone east of Lagos sits on a single contiguous site of roughly 2,635 hectares, with a nameplate distillation capacity of 650,000 barrels per day.....
Nigeria 2026: Oil Receipts, Naira Convergence, and the Fiscal Arithmetic
Three years after the June 2023 naira unification and the simultaneous removal of the PMS subsidy, Nigeria enters 2026 with a fragile fiscal recovery whose durability depends on Brent staying above the mid-seventies and on the CBN holding its nerve at the policy rate.
Nigeria's 2026 macro picture is the first in a decade where the headline numbers on debt service, oil receipts, and the FX premium can be discussed with a straight face. The June 2023 naira unification and the contemporaneous PMS subsidy withdrawal have, in combination, restored a measure of fiscal arithmetic that the prior decade lacked....
Nigeria Year Three Under Tinubu: Reform Cohort, Political Economy, and the 2027 Runway
Three years after the May 2023 inauguration, the Tinubu reform cohort has rebuilt the macro arithmetic that Emefiele governance hollowed out. The political economy of holding the reforms through 2027 is the harder problem.
Bola Ahmed Tinubu took office on 29 May 2023 and within fourteen days had ended the petroleum motor spirit subsidy and instructed the Central Bank to collapse the multi-window foreign exchange regime. The naira moved from 460 per dollar to a NAFEM rate that printed near 1,520 in March 2026, and headline inflation peaked at 34.80 percent i...
South Africa's Government of National Unity Under Stress: MK's Rise and the Road to 2029
Twenty two months after the African National Congress fell below 50 percent for the first time since 1994, the ten party Government of National Unity has held together on the budget vote and broken on signature legislation. The MK Party has displaced the Economic Freedom Fighters as the leading opposition voice, KwaZulu Natal sits outside the GNU envelope, and the 2029 succession question has already begun to reorder the cabinet.
On May 29, 2024, the African National Congress recorded 40.18 percent of the National Assembly vote, its first sub majority result since 1994, returning 159 of 400 seats. The Democratic Alliance held second place at 21.81 percent (87 seats), the Umkhonto we Sizwe Party led by former President Jacob Zuma took 14.58 percent (58 seats) on it...
South Africa 2026: Load Shedding Recovery, GNU Economics, Treasury Credibility
Eskom availability has clawed back from crisis lows, the Government of National Unity is testing whether coalition politics can hold a fiscal anchor, and Treasury credibility now hinges on whether transmission build, REIPPPP procurement, and Operation Vulindlela can convert kilowatt hours into GDP growth before the 2027 budget cycle.
South Africa enters the second quarter of 2026 with load shedding largely suspended for the first sustained stretch since 2021, but the recovery is fragile and uneven. Eskom's energy availability factor has rebuilt from the low fifties to the mid sixties, the REIPPPP and battery storage windows are finally clearing financial close, and th...
South Africa 2026: the GNU power deal, Eskom unbundling, and the second draft of the Just Energy Transition
After 332 days of loadshedding in 2023, the grid stabilized through 2024 and the African National Congress lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1994. Cyril Ramaphosa's Government of National Unity now has to ratify the National Transmission Company, restructure Eskom debt, and convert USD 11.6 billion of climate finance pledges into hard megawatts.
South Africa entered 2026 with the most consequential political and electricity sector reset since 1994. The May 29, 2024 election delivered the African National Congress 40.18 percent, the Democratic Alliance 21.81 percent, the new MK Party 14.58 percent, and the Economic Freedom Fighters 9.52 percent, ending 30 years of single party rul...
South Africa Logistics Reset: Transnet, the GNU, and the 2026 Recovery Path
Transnet Freight Rail volumes fell from 226 million tonnes in fiscal 2018 to 152 million in fiscal 2024. The Government of National Unity has to convert the 2022 National Rail Policy and Operation Vulindlela into a credible third party access regime by 2027.
South African logistics is the most expensive drag on the export economy, and the binding constraint is Transnet. Transnet Freight Rail moved 226.3 million tonnes in fiscal 2018, fell to 149.5 million tonnes in fiscal 2023, and recovered modestly to 151.7 million tonnes in fiscal 2024. The Sishen to Saldanha iron ore channel shipped 50.4 ...
Tanzania 2026: Hassan's full mandate, the USD 42 billion LNG decision, and the East African corridor play
Samia Suluhu Hassan secured a full term in October 2025 on a CCM ticket that has now governed Tanzania for 65 years. The decisions facing Dodoma in 2026 are concrete: take final investment decision on the Lindi LNG project with Equinor and Shell, finance the TAZARA rehabilitation to plug into Lobito, and hold a 5 percent growth path while the IMF Extended Credit Facility runs to 2026.
Tanzania has stabilized macro fundamentals under President Hassan: real GDP grew 5.4 percent in 2024 per the National Bureau of Statistics, headline inflation held at 3.1 percent on Bank of Tanzania data, and the shilling traded near TZS 2,750 to the dollar through 2025. The October 2025 general election returned Hassan with an official 9...
Tanzania LNG and the East African Gas Decade
The May 2024 Tanzania LNG Host Government Agreement restarted a decade of stalled progress at Lindi, but the USD 42 billion FID has slipped into 2026 and 2027. Mozambique is restarting in parallel, and East African gas is shifting from option value to physical supply.
East Africa is shifting from stranded gas headlines to two anchor liquefaction complexes under active development. Tanzania signed the Host Government Agreement at State House in May 2024 with Equinor, Shell, and TPDC, ending a decade of stalled negotiation under Magufuli era resource nationalism. The integrated USD 42 billion Lindi LNG p...
West Africa Wheat Shock 2026: Import Dependence, Fiscal Pass-Through, and Political Risk
How a tightening Black Sea balance, a rigid Russian export quota cycle, and weakening CFA and naira positions are reshaping bread economics from Dakar to Abuja.
West Africa enters the second quarter of 2026 with the highest wheat import bill in its history, driven by a thinner Black Sea exportable surplus, a punitive Russian quota cycle running from February to June, and weakening local currencies. Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso together import roughly 13 to 14 million t...