Where the math is defensible.
Long-form research on live enterprise decisions. Publication is selective. Every number traces to a named source. No takes without evidence.
AfCFTA Execution 2026: From Tariff Schedules to Settled Trades
Six years after the Agreement entered into force, the African Continental Free Trade Area is moving from text to transactions: the Guided Trade Initiative is widening, the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System is now live across more than sixteen central banks, and the rules of origin file for manufactured goods finally cleared.
The AfCFTA entered into force on 30 May 2019 and now organizes 54 of 55 African Union members into a single market of roughly 1.4 billion people. Execution in 2026 rests on four moving parts: the Guided Trade Initiative, which expanded from eight pilot countries in 2022 to a wider Phase 2 cohort by 2025; the Pan-African Payment and Settle...
EU CBAM in 2026: the next round of sector and scope expansion
The transition phase ended in January, the definitive phase has begun, and Brussels is already debating which sectors and scopes come next. Exposure mapping and contract repricing cannot wait for the next regulation.
On January 1, 2026, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism crossed from reporting into a definitive phase that requires importers of cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen to surrender CBAM certificates priced against the EU ETS. The political debate has already moved on to what comes next: chemicals, ...
Japan Rice Crisis and the Gentan Unwind: Pricing, Politics, and the Reform Window of 2026
Empty supermarket shelves in August 2024, a 60 percent spot price surge, and a reserve release of 210,000 tonnes have shattered the post gentan equilibrium. Koizumi reform proposals, JA Zen Noh dominance, and the 2025 Lower House vote now define the policy contest.
Japan ran out of rice in late August 2024. Retail inventories at supermarket level fell to roughly 80,000 tonnes against a normal carry of about 200,000 tonnes, prompting MAFF to release 210,000 tonnes from the government emergency stockpile in September 2024 (the first such release since the program was created in 1995). Spot wholesale p...
Mexico nearshoring in 2026: where the math actually clears
Mexico's nearshoring narrative is real in some sectors and aspirational in others. The 2026 USMCA review window, capacity ceilings, and security risk separate the contracts that close from the press releases that do not.
Mexico has captured a meaningful share of US import demand displaced from China since 2018, but the gains are concentrated in autos, machinery, and a narrow band of electronics, not in textiles or labor intensive assembly. FDI flows reported by Banxico and Secretaria de Economia confirm rising commitments, yet greenfield announcements out...
USMCA Article 34.7: The July 2026 Review and the Renegotiation Already Underway
The first six-year joint review opens July 2026. Trump's tariff threats, Sheinbaum's Plan Mexico, automotive rules of origin, and a Mexico-now-largest US trade partner make this the most consequential trilateral negotiation since 1994.
USMCA Article 34.7 mandates a joint review six years after entry into force. The first review opens July 2026. Failure of all three parties to affirm continuation triggers a 16 year sunset window. The 2024 to 2025 backdrop has shifted the negotiation: US merchandise trade with Mexico reached USD 798 billion in 2024 per the US Census Burea...
Morocco's automotive cluster 2026: Tangier, Kenitra, and the EV transition test
Renault Tangier Med, Stellantis Kenitra, and a phosphate to LFP cathode play position Morocco as Europe's nearshore EV factory, but CBAM, US Foreign Entity of Concern rules, and rules of origin renegotiation will decide which of the projects actually clear.
Morocco's automotive sector overtook phosphates and agri food to become the country's largest goods export in 2023 and consolidated that lead through 2025, with shipments reported by the Office des Changes crossing 157 billion dirhams, equivalent to roughly 14.6 billion euros. The Renault Tangier Med complex passed one million cumulative ...
Panama Canal water economics 2026: Gatun Lake, transit auctions, and the Rio Indio reservoir bet
The 2023 to 2024 drought cut Panama Canal daily transits from 36 to 22, drove a single slot auction to USD 4.0 million, and forced US grain, LPG, and LNG cargoes onto Cape and Suez routings. The Rio Indio reservoir at USD 1.2 to 1.6 billion is the structural answer, but it does not commission until 2030.
The Autoridad del Canal de Panama (ACP) reported FY2023 transit revenue of USD 4.97 billion on 14,080 oceangoing transits, then cut its booking slot count from 36 in normal conditions to 22 by November 2023 as Gatun Lake fell to 79.7 feet against the 87 foot ideal. One transit slot auctioned for USD 3.975 million in November 2023, the hig...
Section 232 metals review 2026: steel, aluminum, and the next round
Eight years after Proclamations 9704 and 9705, the Section 232 framework on steel and aluminum is heading into a 2026 review that will reshape exclusions, expand product coverage, and tighten the seam with BIS export controls.
Section 232 tariffs of 25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum have now operated for nearly a decade, evolving from blanket measures into a patchwork of country deals, tariff rate quotas, and product exclusions. The 2026 review window opens against a backdrop of persistent global overcapacity, sharper BIS export controls on critica...
The 2026 tariff playbook: layered overlays, real exposures
The 2026 US tariff regime is not one policy. It is six overlapping overlays stacked on top of MFN duties, with effective rates that depend on origin classification, content thresholds, and the antidumping order book. The interesting question is not the headline rate, it is which overlay binds for a given product and supplier.
By the spring of 2026 the US import-duty stack runs at least six overlays deep. Section 301 China duties remain in force at the post-September 2024 USTR review schedule, with EV duties at 100 percent and lithium-ion EV battery duties at 25 percent. IRA Section 30D and Section 48D rules have moved foreign entity of concern enforcement from...
United States and China tariff trajectory through 2026: Section 301, the April reciprocal framework, and the Phase One legacy
The 2024 USTR four year review, the April 2025 reciprocal escalation, and the May 2025 de-escalation framework rebuilt the tariff stack on Chinese imports. We map the Section 301 architecture, the bilateral trade collapse, China retaliation, and the deal, freeze, escalate scenarios into 2026.
United States goods imports from China fell from a 2018 peak of 538 billion US dollars to 438 billion in 2024 (US Census Bureau), with the China share of total US goods imports compressed from 21.6 percent in 2017 to 13.4 percent in 2024. The Section 301 stack moved through three phases: the original 2018 to 2019 lists, the May 2024 USTR ...
The American Carbon Border: Foreign Pollution Fee Act in 2026
Cassidy and Graham have resurrected the Foreign Pollution Fee Act with bipartisan momentum. The architecture, partner tiers, and CBO scoring now define the front edge of US trade and climate policy.
Senator Bill Cassidy reintroduced the Foreign Pollution Fee Act (S.1325) in April 2025 with Lindsey Graham as lead Republican coauthor and a small bipartisan caucus drawn from manufacturing belt Democrats. The bill is a partner tier carbon border adjustment, not a domestic carbon price: imports of steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizer, glas...
Vietnam Apparel Substitution Post China Decoupling: The Limits of the Easy Story
Vietnam now ships more knit and woven apparel to the United States than at any point in its history, but the value chain still runs through Chinese mills, and the substitution narrative buckles under rules of origin, port congestion, and FDI absorption ceilings.
The dominant story of the 2020s decoupling cycle is that apparel sourcing has migrated decisively from China to Vietnam. The headline import shares support the claim, but the BACI HS 61 and 62 panel, Vietnamese fabric input data, and on the ground capacity diagnostics tell a more layered story. Vietnam captured assembly volume, not the up...
The CHIPS Act and the Taiwan share that went up, not down
US imports of integrated circuits from Taiwan climbed from 11 percent of the total in 2021 to 28 percent in 2024. Three years into a $52 billion reshoring push, the trade data is pointing the other way. Here is what it actually means.
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 committed $52.7 billion to rebuilding US semiconductor manufacturing. Three and a half years in, Commerce has awarded roughly $33 billion of the $36 billion manufacturing pot. Yet US imports of integrated circuits from Taiwan have more than doubled and Taiwan's share of the US HS 8542 import basket has go...