Where the math is defensible.
Long-form research on live enterprise decisions. Publication is selective. Every number traces to a named source. No takes without evidence.
Algeria 2026: Europe's pipeline pivot, Sonatrach's USD 50 billion bet, and the Maghreb realignment
After Russia, Algeria is now the second largest pipeline gas supplier to the European Union. Tebboune's second term, the Sonatrach 2027 to 2030 capex cycle, and the Western Sahara realignment with Paris will define whether Algiers can hold that position through 2030.
Algeria has moved from a marginal European supplier to the bloc's second largest pipeline gas source by 2024, displacing roughly half of pre war Russian flows into Italy. Sonatrach reported total gas exports of 91 billion cubic meters in 2024, with 26.4 bcm via TransMed to Italy and 8.0 bcm via Medgaz to Spain. The Gazoduc Maghreb Europe ...
Egypt and Eastern Mediterranean Gas: From Exporter to Importer
Zohr's decline, Israel's pipeline lifeline, and idle Idku and Damietta trains have flipped Egypt from regional aggregator to FSRU-dependent importer. The 2026 question is whether Cairo can stabilize before another summer of load shedding.
Egypt's gas system has reversed in three years. Zohr, the field that lifted Egypt to net exporter status in 2018, has fallen from a 2019 peak of roughly 75 bcm per year to about 50 bcm in 2025 as reservoir pressure declined faster than Eni and EGAS modeled. Idku and Damietta LNG trains, which lifted 8 to 9 bcm of LNG per year through 2022...
EU energy independence in 2026: where the diversification math actually clears
Four years after the pipeline shock, the EU has substituted molecules but not yet costs. The 2026 question is whether structural demand destruction and renewable buildout can finish what LNG cargoes started.
By early 2026, the European Union has functionally severed its dependence on Russian pipeline gas, replacing roughly 155 billion cubic meters of pre-war flows with a portfolio of US and Qatari LNG, maximized Norwegian pipeline throughput, and structural demand reduction of about 18 percent below the 2017 to 2021 baseline. The substitution...
The 2026 to 2027 LNG supply wave: 130 mtpa of new liquefaction, Henry Hub pressure, and the buyer's window
Five United States projects plus the Qatari North Field expansion add roughly 130 million tonnes per year of nameplate liquefaction between 2025 and 2027. Henry Hub feedgas demand clears 16 billion cubic feet per day, TTF and JKM spreads compress, and European buyers face a contracting decision they cannot defer.
Global LNG export capacity is set to expand from roughly 480 million tonnes per year at end 2024 to a notional 610 million tonnes per year by end 2027, the largest concentrated build out in the industry's history. The United States contributes Plaquemines (13.3 mtpa), Corpus Christi Stage 3 (10.0 mtpa), Rio Grande Phase 1 (17.6 mtpa), Por...
Mauritania and Senegal 2026: GTA first cargo, BP and Kosmos cash flow, and the MSGBC basin's 50 Tcf moment
Greater Tortue Ahmeyim shipped its first LNG cargo in early 2025 after a five year delay. The next 18 months decide whether BP, Kosmos, Petrosen, and SMHPM can sanction Phase 2, whether Senegal's Faye and Sonko government renegotiates without breaking the project, and whether the MSGBC basin becomes Africa's third LNG axis after Nigeria and Mozambique.
The Greater Tortue Ahmeyim project produced first gas in December 2024 and shipped its first LNG cargo in February 2025, anchoring a Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Conakry (MSGBC) basin holding more than 50 trillion cubic feet of contingent gas resource. BP holds 56 percent of GTA Phase 1, Kosmos Energy 27 percent, Petrosen 1...
Mozambique 2026: Frelimo's contested mandate, the Cabo Delgado stabilization, and the LNG restart
Daniel Chapo's Frelimo continuity rests on a CNE result the streets do not believe, a March 2025 reconciliation with Venancio Mondlane, a Rwandan force holding Cabo Delgado, and a TotalEnergies LNG restart that separates fiscal solvency from a Tuna Bond replay.
Mozambique's October 9, 2024 general election produced the most contested result since multiparty politics began in 1994. The Comissao Nacional de Eleicoes proclaimed Frelimo's Daniel Chapo at 70.7 percent against Venancio Mondlane (Podemos) at 20.3 percent, while the Centro de Integridade Publica parallel tally and the Mais Integridade c...
Panama Canal water economics 2026: Gatun Lake, transit auctions, and the Rio Indio reservoir bet
The 2023 to 2024 drought cut Panama Canal daily transits from 36 to 22, drove a single slot auction to USD 4.0 million, and forced US grain, LPG, and LNG cargoes onto Cape and Suez routings. The Rio Indio reservoir at USD 1.2 to 1.6 billion is the structural answer, but it does not commission until 2030.
The Autoridad del Canal de Panama (ACP) reported FY2023 transit revenue of USD 4.97 billion on 14,080 oceangoing transits, then cut its booking slot count from 36 in normal conditions to 22 by November 2023 as Gatun Lake fell to 79.7 feet against the 87 foot ideal. One transit slot auctioned for USD 3.975 million in November 2023, the hig...
Papua New Guinea LNG and the Pacific Island Pivot, 2026
Two FIDs (Papua LNG taken September 2024, PNG LNG Train 3 expected 2026 to 2027) and a contested Pacific security architecture rewrite the Coral Sea, Solomon, and Polynesian risk map for global energy and defense capital.
Papua New Guinea is on the cusp of doubling LNG output. The TotalEnergies led Papua LNG project (Elk Antelope, 5.4 mtpa, capex around USD 13 billion) reached FID in September 2024 with Santos, Kumul Petroleum, and JX Nippon. The ExxonMobil led PNG LNG Train 3, slipped many times since 2014, is targeting FID in 2026 or 2027 with P'nyang ga...
Tanzania 2026: Hassan's full mandate, the USD 42 billion LNG decision, and the East African corridor play
Samia Suluhu Hassan secured a full term in October 2025 on a CCM ticket that has now governed Tanzania for 65 years. The decisions facing Dodoma in 2026 are concrete: take final investment decision on the Lindi LNG project with Equinor and Shell, finance the TAZARA rehabilitation to plug into Lobito, and hold a 5 percent growth path while the IMF Extended Credit Facility runs to 2026.
Tanzania has stabilized macro fundamentals under President Hassan: real GDP grew 5.4 percent in 2024 per the National Bureau of Statistics, headline inflation held at 3.1 percent on Bank of Tanzania data, and the shilling traded near TZS 2,750 to the dollar through 2025. The October 2025 general election returned Hassan with an official 9...
Tanzania LNG and the East African Gas Decade
The May 2024 Tanzania LNG Host Government Agreement restarted a decade of stalled progress at Lindi, but the USD 42 billion FID has slipped into 2026 and 2027. Mozambique is restarting in parallel, and East African gas is shifting from option value to physical supply.
East Africa is shifting from stranded gas headlines to two anchor liquefaction complexes under active development. Tanzania signed the Host Government Agreement at State House in May 2024 with Equinor, Shell, and TPDC, ending a decade of stalled negotiation under Magufuli era resource nationalism. The integrated USD 42 billion Lindi LNG p...
Trinidad and Venezuela 2026: the Dragon license, Atlantic LNG idle trains, and Caribbean gas arbitrage
Atlantic LNG runs at 9.0 mtpa against 14.8 mtpa nameplate, Train 1 has been idle since end 2020, and the four cross border fields with Venezuela are the only unsanctioned upside. The Dragon, Cocuina, and Manakin Cocuina licenses, OFAC General License 41 and 41A, and the disputed July 2024 Maduro reelection together set the gas balance for the eastern Caribbean through 2028.
Trinidad and Tobago's gas economy is contracting in slow motion. Marketed gas production peaked near 4.0 billion cubic feet per day in 2010 and ran at 2.55 Bcf/d in 2024, a 36 percent drawdown that has stranded one of the four Atlantic LNG trains since end 2020 and capped national LNG output at 9.0 million tonnes per annum against a 14.8 ...