Where the math is defensible.
Long-form research on live enterprise decisions. Publication is selective. Every number traces to a named source. No takes without evidence.
Climate Displacement 2026: Pacific Visas, Loss and Damage, and the Adaptation Finance Gap
Disaster displacement set a fresh record in 2023, the Falepili Union opened the first dedicated climate mobility pathway, and the Loss and Damage Fund began disbursing. The architecture is forming faster than the financing.
Climate driven mobility crossed two thresholds in the past 24 months. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre logged 26.4 million new internal disaster displacements in 2023, the third highest annual count on record, with 8.7 million people still in displacement at year end. UNHCR estimates that of 117 million forcibly displaced globa...
Cuba 2026: Currency Collapse, Blackouts, and the Demographic Drain
Five years after Tarea Ordenamiento, Cuba runs a parallel rate near 380 CUP per dollar against an official 24, 750,000 Cubans have walked into the United States, and the grid fails twice a quarter. The 2026 outlook is contraction with Venezuelan optics.
Cuba's Tarea Ordenamiento, launched January 1, 2021, was framed as a textbook unification: retire the convertible peso (CUC), keep the Cuban peso (CUP), set a single rate at 24 CUP per dollar, and let productivity catch up. Five years on, the official 24 rate persists only for select state transactions, the household informal market clear...
Honduras after Castro: Security, Remittances, and the November 2025 Verdict on the Northern Triangle
Xiomara Castro inherited a narcostate, ran a Bukele lite state of emergency for three years, kept growth above 3 percent, and lost the presidency to the Nationalists on November 30, 2025. The 2026 transition test is whether the IMF program, the maquila base, and the USD 9.7 billion remittance flow survive an Asfura government with a tilted Congress.
Xiomara Castro of LIBRE took office on January 27, 2022 with a narrow congressional plurality, becoming the first woman elected president of Honduras. Through 2024 her administration ran a Bukele inflected security policy, a 36 month USD 830 million IMF Stand By plus Extended Credit Facility approved in September 2023, the unilateral repe...
Tunisia 2026 under Saied: the IMF-less path, BCT monetary financing, and Brussels as last creditor
Kais Saied entered his second term in October 2024 with a 90.7 percent mandate on 28.8 percent turnout, the lowest since 2011, after his two main rivals were jailed. The 2023 IMF deal is dead, the central bank now lends directly to Treasury, and the EU migration package has become the binding external anchor for a 0.4 percent growth economy.
Tunisia is executing a deliberately heterodox stabilization. Saied was reelected on October 6, 2024 with 90.7 percent of valid votes on 28.8 percent turnout (ISIE, the lowest national turnout since 2011), with two principal opponents in detention. The USD 1.9 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility staff-level deal of October 2022 collapsed in...
Venezuela Frozen: Maduro's Third Term, Sanctioned Crude, and the Essequibo Wager
Maduro took a third term on January 10, 2025, after a July 28, 2024 election the CNE called for him with 51 percent and the opposition documented as a Gonzalez Urrutia win. The 2026 question is whether sanctions, oil, migration, and Essequibo break the equilibrium.
On July 28, 2024, Venezuela's CNE proclaimed Nicolas Maduro winner of the presidential election with 51.2 percent against Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia at 44.2 percent, without publishing precinct tallies. The opposition, organized around Maria Corina Machado after her 2023 inhabilitacion, published more than 24,500 actas (over 80 percent of m...