Where the math is defensible.
Long-form research on live enterprise decisions. Publication is selective. Every number traces to a named source. No takes without evidence.
BRICS+ Payments After mBridge: Plumbing Without a Pipeline
The Kazan declaration promised a parallel financial architecture, yet 18 months on the BRICS+ rail is a patchwork of bilateral corridors, while the dollar still clears 47 percent of SWIFT traffic and anchors 58 percent of allocated reserves.
BRICS+ leaders left Kazan in October 2024 with a communique that name-checked BRICS Pay, a cross-border depository called BRICS Clear, and local-currency settlement, but stopped short of any unified currency. Days later the BIS Innovation Hub announced its withdrawal from Project mBridge, leaving China, the HKMA, Thailand, the UAE, and Sa...
Iran 2026: Pezeshkian, the Trump JCPOA-2 Track, and the Proliferation Fiscal Nexus
Tehran sits on roughly 280 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, a collapsing rial, and a reformist president whose mandate from Khamenei is narrow. Witkoff's negotiating channel is open, snapback has fired, and the next deal will be priced as much by fiscal arithmetic as by centrifuge counts.
Iran enters the second quarter of 2026 inside three converging crises that any JCPOA-2 track must price together. The IAEA February 2026 verification report records roughly 280 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. Maximum pressure sanctions reimposed in the first quarter of 2025 have cut crude exports from peaks near 1.6 million b...
Iran 2026: Oil Exports Under Sanctions, China Shadow Flows, Fiscal Arithmetic
Tehran is exporting more crude than at any point since 2018, but the gap between gross barrels lifted and net dollars repatriated has rarely been wider. We map the shadow fleet, OFAC enforcement cycles, and three scenarios for 2026 to 2027.
Iran is shipping roughly 1.65 to 1.80 million barrels per day of crude and condensate in early 2026, almost all of it to Chinese independent refiners via a shadow fleet of 350 plus tankers using ship-to-ship transfers off Malaysia, Singapore, and increasingly the Sea of Oman. Discounts to Brent have widened from 8 dollars per barrel in 20...
Iran 2026: snapback aftermath, the 60 percent stockpile, and the second maximum pressure cycle
The E3 triggered the JCPOA snapback in September 2025, restoring six United Nations Security Council resolutions on Iran. The IAEA verified 274.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium before camera dismantlement. Trump's NSPM 2 has reactivated maximum pressure on roughly 1.6 to 1.8 million barrels per day of Iranian crude exports flowing primarily to Chinese teapot refiners.
On September 27, 2025, snapback under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 paragraph 11 entered into force after the United Kingdom, France, and Germany invoked the dispute resolution mechanism on August 28. Six pre 2015 UN sanctions resolutions returned, ending the JCPOA framework de jure. The IAEA Director General report GOV/...
Myanmar 2026: A Fractured State, a Collapsing Kyat, and the Economics of Lost Territory
Five years after the coup, the Tatmadaw has ceded most border regions to the Three Brotherhood Alliance and PDFs, the kyat has lost two thirds of its parallel-market value, and the economy runs on garments, jade, and gold across borders the junta no longer holds.
The 1 February 2021 State Administration Council coup triggered the deepest contraction in Myanmar's post-independence history, with real GDP falling roughly 18 percent in 2021 (World Bank Myanmar Economic Monitor, June 2022). The Operation 1027 offensive launched on 27 October 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance broke the territorial ...
DPRK and Russia 2026: Arms, Labor, and the Sanctions Regime in Collapse
The June 2024 Pyongyang summit converted a transactional munitions deal into a treaty-level alignment, the UN sanctions architecture lost its enforcement spine in March 2024, and the Korean Peninsula now sits inside a Eurasian deterrence problem rather than a regional one.
Vladimir Putin's June 2024 visit to Pyongyang produced a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty whose Article 4 commits each party to provide military assistance using all available means in the event of armed attack on the other. Eighteen months later, North Korea has shipped an estimated 5 to 6 million 152mm artillery rounds, dozens...
Russia and China Gas in 2026: Power of Siberia 1 Ramps, Power of Siberia 2 Stalls, and the New Eastern Pricing Reality
Power of Siberia 1 is approaching contractual capacity, Power of Siberia 2 is hostage to a Gazprom and CNPC pricing impasse, and the loss of European volumes has shifted Moscow into a structurally weaker eastern bargain.
Russian pipeline gas to China is on track to fill the 38 bcm Power of Siberia 1 contract through 2026, with 2024 deliveries near 31 bcm and 2025 estimates approaching design capacity. The proposed 50 bcm Power of Siberia 2 line via Mongolia is stalled at FID by a pricing standoff with CNPC, Mongolian transit terms, and Beijing's preferenc...
Russia trade isolation 2026: where the sanctions math actually bites
Four years after the invasion, the headline restrictions look porous, but the second order effects on price realization, component quality, and capital costs are reshaping Russian industrial capacity in ways the trade data only partially captures.
Russia has rerouted roughly two thirds of its pre 2022 European trade through Asia, the Gulf, and a sprawling intermediation network running through Turkey, the UAE, and Central Asia. Headline volumes have largely recovered, yet the realized economics tell a different story. Crude discounts persist, the shadow fleet is aging into insuranc...
Switzerland 2026: UBS After Credit Suisse, Russian Asset Gridlock, and the Limits of Neutrality
The forced Credit Suisse rescue closed one crisis and opened a slower one. UBS now carries a balance sheet larger than Swiss GDP, the Federal Council is rewriting capital and resolution rules, the Russian asset freeze has stalled at CHF 7.5 billion, and Singapore is taking share at the top of the wealth pyramid.
Three years after the March 2023 forced merger, UBS Group AG sits at the center of Swiss macro-financial risk. The transaction price of CHF 3 billion, the CHF 9 billion federal loss-protection guarantee, the CHF 250 billion liquidity backstop, and the controversial writedown of CHF 16 billion of Credit Suisse Additional Tier 1 bonds reset...
Syria 2026: post Assad transition, Caesar relief, and reconstruction priorities
Bashar al Assad fled to Moscow on December 8, 2024 after an eleven day HTS offensive. Ahmad al Sharaa was named transitional president on January 30, 2025. Trump revoked Caesar Act sanctions on June 30, 2025.
The fall of the Assad family's 53 year rule on December 8, 2024 is the most consequential Levant inflection since 2011. Hayat Tahrir al Sham took Aleppo on November 30, Hama on December 5, and Damascus eight days after the Idlib breakout. Bashar al Assad flew to Moscow under Russian protection. HTS leader Ahmad al Sharaa, formerly Abu Moh...
Venezuela Frozen: Maduro's Third Term, Sanctioned Crude, and the Essequibo Wager
Maduro took a third term on January 10, 2025, after a July 28, 2024 election the CNE called for him with 51 percent and the opposition documented as a Gonzalez Urrutia win. The 2026 question is whether sanctions, oil, migration, and Essequibo break the equilibrium.
On July 28, 2024, Venezuela's CNE proclaimed Nicolas Maduro winner of the presidential election with 51.2 percent against Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia at 44.2 percent, without publishing precinct tallies. The opposition, organized around Maria Corina Machado after her 2023 inhabilitacion, published more than 24,500 actas (over 80 percent of m...