Where the math is defensible.
Long-form research on live enterprise decisions. Publication is selective. Every number traces to a named source. No takes without evidence.
Africa's 2026 Sovereign Restructuring Cycle: Common Framework Outcomes, China Bilateral Geometry, and IMF Program Design
Six African sovereigns defaulted between 2020 and 2024. Zambia, Ghana, Chad, and Ethiopia have now closed Eurobond and bilateral deals. The pipeline runs through Egypt, Angola, Tunisia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal, while 21 Sub Saharan countries are in active IMF programs and external debt service hits roughly USD 100 billion in 2025 and 2026.
Africa's external Eurobond stock peaked near USD 145 billion in 2021 and stood at roughly USD 140 billion at end 2024, per S&P Global Ratings. Six issuers defaulted across 2020 to 2024: Zambia, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique on the Tuna Bond, and Mali on regional debt. The G20 Common Framework, launched in November 2020, has now produc...
Asia Private Credit 2026: The USD 200 Billion Pivot, Spillover Plumbing, and the Risk Indicators That Matter
Asia private credit has moved from a 5 percent slice of the global pool in 2018 to roughly 11 percent in 2025, with Singapore and Hong Kong as twin booking hubs and Apollo, Blackstone, KKR, Blue Owl, PAG, and Hillhouse as the marginal pricers. Spread compression versus broadly syndicated loans, BDC leverage in the United States, and insurance balance sheet linkages set up the 2026 risk map.
Global private credit assets under management reached approximately USD 2.1 trillion at end 2024 per Preqin and IMF GFSR October 2024, with Asia Pacific accounting for USD 124 billion, up from USD 36 billion in 2018. Singapore and Hong Kong host the bulk of regional booking, supported by the MAS Variable Capital Companies regime (1,200 pl...
Brazil 2026: Lula, the Arcabouco, and Sovereign Rating Trajectory
Brazil approaches the October 2026 first round with Lula seeking a fourth term at 80, an Arcabouco Fiscal under stress, Selic at 14.25 percent, and the IBS plus CBS dual VAT entering its 2026 to 2032 transition. Sovereign rating direction depends on three calls.
Brazil heads into the October 4, 2026 first round and likely October 25 runoff with Lula da Silva, who turned 80 on October 27, 2025, declared as the PT candidate for a fourth term. Opposition runs through Sao Paulo Governor Tarcisio de Freitas, Parana Governor Ratinho Junior, Goias Governor Ronaldo Caiado, and Minas Gerais Governor Romeu...
Cambodia 2026: Hun Manet's Inherited State, the Funan Techo Canal, and the Quiet Pivot to Beijing
Hun Manet took the premiership on 22 August 2023, ground broke on the 180 km Funan Techo Canal in August 2024, the PLA Navy berthed at Ream in July 2024, and US buyers absorbed about 9 billion dollars of Cambodian apparel in 2024.
Hun Manet, West Point class of 1999 and son of Hun Sen, was sworn in as Cambodia's 36th prime minister on 22 August 2023, four weeks after the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) took 120 of 125 National Assembly seats (National Election Committee). The succession is dynastic and the policy envelope tilts firmly toward Beijing. On 5 August 202...
China LGFV Debt Resolution: The CNY 12 Trillion Swap, Property Overhang, and the 2026 Counter-Cyclical Test
On November 8, 2024 the National People's Congress Standing Committee endorsed a CNY 12 trillion frame to absorb local government hidden debt. Property investment fell 10.6 percent in 2024, Country Garden, Evergrande and Vanke moved through default and restructuring, and the PBoC cut the 7 day reverse repo rate to 1.5 percent. The 2026 question is whether the Three Year Action Plan converts a stock problem into a flow problem without monetizing it.
On November 8, 2024 NPC Standing Committee Chairman Zhao Leji and Finance Minister Lan Fo'an presented a CNY 12 trillion frame for local government hidden debt resolution: a CNY 6 trillion direct quota raised over 2024 to 2026, CNY 4 trillion of new local government special bond capacity repurposed toward debt swap, and a CNY 2 trillion l...
Defense M&A in 2026: Primes Consolidate, Drones Reprice, Tier-2 Roll-Ups Compound
NATO 2 percent compliance, the Sondervermoegen, and a USD 2.71 trillion global defense outlay are pulling capital into munitions, autonomy, space, and cyber faster than the prime base can absorb it. The 2026 deal map shows three distinct games playing out at once.
Global military spending crossed USD 2.71 trillion in 2024 according to SIPRI, the steepest year on year jump since the end of the Cold War, and 2025 print is tracking above USD 2.9 trillion on Janes and IISS preliminary data. NATO recorded 23 of 32 allies meeting the 2 percent of GDP guideline in 2024, against 11 in 2023 and 3 in 2014. G...
Estonia 2026: Digital Sovereignty, NATO's Tip of the Spear, and the BRELL Exit
Tallinn pairs the world's most advanced digital state with the alliance's highest defense burden ratio at 3.43 percent of GDP, even as Eesti Pank cuts rates and Estonia detaches from the Russian BRELL grid in February 2025.
Estonia, population 1.37 million, contracted 3.0 percent in 2023 and 0.3 percent in 2024 (Eesti Statistika), absorbed Russia sanctions exposure, and resumed cautious growth in 2025 as Eesti Pank tracked the ECB deposit facility rate from 4.00 percent in mid 2023 to 2.40 percent by April 2025. The country exports digital governance as poli...
Green steel, hydrogen DRI, and the 2026 transition: from Hesgang to Boden, from CBAM to 45V
The blast furnace pathway still makes 70 percent of the world's steel. Hydrogen DRI plus EAF is now moving from pilot to first commercial scale in 2025 and 2026, and the policy stack of CBAM, 45V, and Innovation Fund grants determines who clears the cost gap.
Global crude steel production reached 1.85 billion tonnes in 2024 (worldsteel), with China at 1,005 Mt, India at 149 Mt, and the United States at 79 Mt. The integrated blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace (BF and BOF) route, responsible for roughly 70 percent of output, runs at 1.85 to 2.3 tonnes of carbon dioxide per tonne of crude ste...
Haiti Under Gang Rule, Kenya MSS, and the Failed Stabilisation Trade
Port-au-Prince has fallen to roughly 80 percent gang control, the Kenya led Multinational Security Support mission stalled at about 1,300 personnel against a 2,500 ceiling, and humanitarian collapse now defines policy choice across CARICOM, the OAS, and the United States.
Haiti's 2024 to 2026 trajectory describes the worst Western Hemisphere security collapse since the Cold War. The Viv Ansanm gang coalition led by Jimmy Cherizier (Barbecue) launched a coordinated offensive in March 2024, seized the National Penitentiary, and forced Prime Minister Ariel Henry to announce resignation on March 11, 2024. A ni...
Prabowo year one: governance, Danantara, and the soft repricing of the Indonesia trade
October 2024 to October 2025 stress tested the Prabowo administration's appetite for fiscal discretion, executive consolidation of state assets, and a foreign policy reset toward BRICS without rupturing the orthodox anchors that underwrote the Widodo decade.
Prabowo Subianto's first twelve months produced a governance regime distinct from anything in post 1998 Indonesia. The cabinet swelled to 109 ministers and vice ministers, Sri Mulyani Indrawati was replaced at Keuangan in February 2025, Bahlil Lahadalia consolidated power across investment and energy, and the Danantara holding launched in...
Long duration storage 2026: the four day battery becomes bankable
The LDES Council target of 4 day median duration, the IRA Section 48E investment tax credit at 30 to 50 percent, and Form Energy's first commercial iron air block in Lincoln Maine pulled long duration storage from a thesis into a procurement category.
Long duration energy storage (LDES) became a bankable asset class between 2024 and 2026. The LDES Council 2024 update set a 4 day median discharge target for the technologies that would matter, defined as 10 to 24 hour systems for daily firming and 100 hour systems for multi day reliability. Form Energy energized its first commercial iron...
South Sudan 2026: oil restart, fiscal collapse, and post conflict risk
The February 2024 rupture of the Greater Nile Pipeline through war torn Sudan cut Juba's oil revenue by roughly two thirds. The 2026 restart is a stabilization wager priced against pipeline risk, election delay, and a currency that has lost more than ninety percent of its dollar value.
South Sudan entered 2026 with crude production around 150,000 barrels per day, less than half of the 2011 secession peak of 350,000 bpd, after the Sudan civil war severed exports of Dar Blend and Nile Blend through the pipeline corridor to Port Sudan. Oil financed roughly ninety percent of government revenue before the shock, and the Worl...
The 2026 tariff playbook: layered overlays, real exposures
The 2026 US tariff regime is not one policy. It is six overlapping overlays stacked on top of MFN duties, with effective rates that depend on origin classification, content thresholds, and the antidumping order book. The interesting question is not the headline rate, it is which overlay binds for a given product and supplier.
By the spring of 2026 the US import-duty stack runs at least six overlays deep. Section 301 China duties remain in force at the post-September 2024 USTR review schedule, with EV duties at 100 percent and lithium-ion EV battery duties at 25 percent. IRA Section 30D and Section 48D rules have moved foreign entity of concern enforcement from...
Trump's AI Action Plan: Compute Sovereignty, Export Control Reset, and the Frontier Regulatory Vacuum
Executive Order 14179, the rescinded AI Diffusion Framework, the Stargate USD 500B compute commitment, and a renamed AI Safety Institute together redraw US AI governance around speed, capital, and selective export pressure rather than precaution.
On January 23, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14179, Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, rescinding Biden's EO 14110 and ordering an AI Action Plan within 180 days. By July 2025 the plan launched with a 60 day Request for Information that drew submissions from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta,...
United States and China tariff trajectory through 2026: Section 301, the April reciprocal framework, and the Phase One legacy
The 2024 USTR four year review, the April 2025 reciprocal escalation, and the May 2025 de-escalation framework rebuilt the tariff stack on Chinese imports. We map the Section 301 architecture, the bilateral trade collapse, China retaliation, and the deal, freeze, escalate scenarios into 2026.
United States goods imports from China fell from a 2018 peak of 538 billion US dollars to 438 billion in 2024 (US Census Bureau), with the China share of total US goods imports compressed from 21.6 percent in 2017 to 13.4 percent in 2024. The Section 301 stack moved through three phases: the original 2018 to 2019 lists, the May 2024 USTR ...
AI capex met the grid: when the megawatt curve breaks
Hyperscaler capital spending crossed 500 billion dollars across 2025 and 2026 while the average US interconnection wait sits above 4 years. The constraint is no longer chips. It is megawatts on a calendar.
AI infrastructure capex has cleared 500 billion dollars across 2025 and 2026 between the four hyperscalers, NVIDIA, Oracle, and the new wave of neoclouds. The chips are arriving. The grid is not. Lawrence Berkeley National Lab puts the active US interconnection queue above 2,600 gigawatts, with median wait times above 4 years and rising. ...
Where AI productivity actually shows up: a sector decomposition
Aggregate US labor productivity grew 2.7 percent in 2024 and 1.9 percent annualized through Q4 2025. The AI signal in those numbers is real but narrow. It lives in five sectors and a dozen occupations, not in the headline.
Two years into broad enterprise AI deployment, the productivity question has moved from speculation to measurement. BLS labor productivity data show nonfarm business output per hour up 2.7 percent in 2024 and roughly 1.9 percent annualized through 2025, above the 2007 to 2019 trend of 1.4 percent. BEA multifactor productivity data lag by ...
Bangladesh ready-made garments under 2026 tariff stress
Bangladesh's ready-made garment sector enters 2026 carrying three simultaneous shocks. The US tariff schedule has hardened, EU EBA preferences are on a graduation timer, and forced-labor enforcement is migrating from policy text to seizure data. The interesting question is which factor cohorts survive intact and which lose orders to Vietnam, India, and Cambodia.
Bangladesh exported approximately 38.4 billion dollars in HS 61 (knitted apparel) and HS 62 (woven apparel) combined in 2024 per BACI and BGMEA reconciled data, second only to China among apparel suppliers and roughly 11.5 percent of global apparel trade. The United States and the European Union together absorbed about 70 percent of those...
Food-shock propagation in 2026: from CPI to political risk
A 25 percent move in wheat, rice, or sugar in 2026 reaches household budgets in eight import-dependent countries within 90 days, blows out fiscal subsidy lines within six months, and shows up as street pressure inside a year. The propagation chain is mappable.
A 2026 food shock has three plausible origins: a Black Sea wheat disruption, an Indian rice export ban extension, or a Brazilian and Indian sugar squeeze tied to ethanol diversion and cane yield loss. Each origin moves through the same five-stage chain: futures markets, freight and FX, landed import prices, domestic CPI, and fiscal subsid...
Reading labor markets: persistence indicators across 60 LMICs
Labor market shocks do not dissipate at the same speed everywhere. In a sample of 60 lower and middle income countries, the half-life of an unemployment shock ranges from under 9 months to more than 7 years. That single number reorders priorities for development programs and macro forecasts.
This brief applies AR(1) persistence and half-life methodology to three labor market series across 60 lower and middle income countries using World Bank WDI and ILO ILOSTAT data from 1991 through 2024. Average AR(1) coefficient on unemployment is 0.78, on total labor force participation is 0.91, and on female labor force participation is ...
The 2026 macro-financial risk landscape: where the brittle joints are
Five specific joints in the global financial system are carrying load they were not designed for. The interesting question for 2026 is not whether stress arrives, but which joint cracks first and how the others respond.
Headline financial conditions look benign in the spring of 2026. ICE BofA US High Yield OAS sits in the low 300 basis point range, the FRB Chicago National Financial Conditions Index reads negative, and the VIX is below its long-run median. Underneath, five specific joints are carrying real stress. Regional bank commercial real estate con...
What makes a Deluair brief defensible: the methodology bar
Every memo we ship has to clear the same bar a hostile referee at the American Economic Review would apply. The phase-based workflow, the no-mock-data rule, the replication package, the bounds analysis, and the em-dash discipline all serve a single purpose: a brief that survives the most aggressive reading a competent skeptic can give it.
The defensibility of a research brief is not a writing question. It is a workflow question. This essay walks through the six-phase research workflow that governs every Deluair engagement (planning, data, estimation, writing, audit, submission), the first-principles discipline that anchors design choices in economic logic rather than conve...
The CHIPS Act and the Taiwan share that went up, not down
US imports of integrated circuits from Taiwan climbed from 11 percent of the total in 2021 to 28 percent in 2024. Three years into a $52 billion reshoring push, the trade data is pointing the other way. Here is what it actually means.
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 committed $52.7 billion to rebuilding US semiconductor manufacturing. Three and a half years in, Commerce has awarded roughly $33 billion of the $36 billion manufacturing pot. Yet US imports of integrated circuits from Taiwan have more than doubled and Taiwan's share of the US HS 8542 import basket has go...
The 3.2x compute curve: what GB200 actually changes about training ROI
NVIDIA says 4x. A CFO needs the number closer to 3.2x, and only above 55 percent utilization.
NVIDIA positioned GB200 NVL72 as a 4x training improvement over H100. On a workload-weighted, all-in-cost basis the number is closer to 3.2x, and only if sustained utilization clears a 55 to 60 percent threshold. This brief unpacks the curve, where the gains come from in hardware terms, and the three places the ROI tends to break in real ...