Trade and tariff analytics 2026-04-26 9 minute read

Solar PV Manufacturing 2026: China Oversupply, US Tariff Defense, India Capacity Ramp

Module prices have collapsed under Chinese overcapacity, while Washington and New Delhi build parallel domestic supply chains behind tariff walls and production credits. We map the new geography of solar manufacturing and translate it into procurement, hedging, and policy decisions for 2026 to 2028.

The solar photovoltaic industry enters 2026 with roughly twice the module manufacturing capacity that global demand can absorb, almost all of it concentrated in China. Module spot prices have fallen below ten cents per watt, wiping out margins for integrated producers and forcing capacity rationalization. The United States has responded with antidumping and countervailing duties on Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, layered on top of Section 201 and Section 301 measures, while the Section 45X advanced manufacturing credit has triggered more than fifty gigawatts of announced US module and cell capacity. India is using the Production Linked Incentive scheme and the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers to ring fence its domestic market. We model three trade and pricing scenarios for the period 2026 to 2028 and quantify the implications for buyers, developers, and policymakers.

The capacity wave: how oversupply became structural #

Global nameplate capacity for solar modules now stands near 1,400 gigawatts of annual output, against installed demand of roughly 650 gigawatts in 2025 and a projected 720 to 780 gigawatts in 2026. Polysilicon, wafer, cell, and module capacity each exceed terawatt scale, and the entire stack is concentrated in the People's Republic of China, which holds between 80 and 95 percent of capacity at every step. The buildout was financed during the 2021 to 2023 boom by provincial governments seeking industrial anchors, by listed manufacturers tapping equity markets at peak valuations, and by integrated players defending share through vertical expansion.

The result is a classic commodity downcycle, but with two complications. First, the marginal cost curve is unusually flat: the cash cost of producing a TOPCon module in a fully depreciated Chinese factory now sits in the seven to nine cent per watt range, leaving very little room for cost based exit. Second, local government incentives, employment commitments, and bank forbearance keep loss making lines running far longer than free market logic would predict. TradeWeave's manufacturing tracker shows that announced capacity rationalization in 2025 totaled only about 90 gigawatts, against industry losses estimated above 40 billion dollars, suggesting that the shakeout has years left to run.

Pricing collapse and the new economics of modules #

Module spot prices fell from roughly 26 cents per watt in early 2023 to below 9 cents per watt by late 2025 for mainstream Chinese mono PERC and TOPCon products delivered ex works. N type bifacial modules have converged toward the same band as the technology premium has compressed. For US buyers, however, landed costs sit two to four times higher depending on origin, tariff treatment, and whether the product qualifies for domestic content adders.

The table below summarizes representative delivered prices that buyers, EPCs, and IPPs are quoting through Promethean's procurement benchmarking panel for the second quarter of 2026.

Origin and productEx works price (USD/W)US landed price (USD/W)India landed price (USD/W)
China TOPCon mono bifacial0.0850.32 to 0.380.18 to 0.22
Southeast Asia TOPCon (post AD/CVD)0.110.28 to 0.340.19 to 0.23
US assembled module (cells imported)0.270.27 to 0.31n/a
US assembled module with US cells0.340.34 to 0.38n/a
India ALMM listed module0.21n/a0.21 to 0.25
Table 1. Representative module pricing by origin, Q2 2026 (Promethean procurement panel; prices reflect 550 to 620 watt bifacial TOPCon, before Section 45X transferable credit value).

The US tariff stack and the end of Southeast Asia transshipment #

American trade defense on solar has evolved from a single Section 201 safeguard in 2018 into a layered architecture. Imports now potentially face Section 201 tariffs, Section 301 China duties, antidumping and countervailing duties from the original 2012 China case, the 2024 Southeast Asia AD/CVD investigation against Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act detention regime. The Southeast Asia case, brought by the American Alliance for Solar Manufacturing Trade Committee, produced final affirmative determinations in 2025 with combined AD/CVD margins ranging from roughly 30 percent to over 270 percent depending on producer and country.

The practical effect has been a rapid rerouting of supply. Indonesia, Laos, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia and Oman have emerged as the next round of assembly hubs, in many cases backed by the same Chinese parent companies that previously operated in Vietnam or Malaysia. The US Department of Commerce has signaled that it will scrutinize country of origin claims aggressively, including through scope rulings and circumvention inquiries. For procurement teams, the operating assumption through 2028 should be that any new low cost geography will face a petition within 18 to 30 months of meaningful US import volumes.

Section 45X and the US manufacturing buildout #

The Inflation Reduction Act's Section 45X advanced manufacturing production credit pays domestic producers per unit of clean energy component sold to unrelated parties. For solar, the headline values are 7 cents per watt for modules, 4 cents per watt for cells, 12 cents per square meter for wafers, and 3 dollars per kilogram for polysilicon, with credits stacking through the value chain. The credit is transferable for cash, which has allowed tax equity style monetization without the complexity of partnership flips.

Announced US module capacity has grown from under 8 gigawatts in 2022 to more than 55 gigawatts of operating or under construction capacity by early 2026, with cell capacity following at roughly 25 gigawatts. The economics still depend critically on 45X: a US module line producing at 32 cents per watt cash cost competes with imported product only because the 7 cent module credit, plus a 4 cent cell credit when cells are made domestically, narrows the gap to a level that domestic content adders on the project side can close. Any reform that phases out 45X early, narrows transferability, or tightens foreign entity of concern rules would reset the investment case for at least a third of announced projects.

India's PLI scheme and the ALMM market wall #

India is pursuing a parallel but more inward facing strategy. The Production Linked Incentive scheme for high efficiency solar modules, run in two tranches by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, has allocated roughly 48 gigawatts of integrated polysilicon to module capacity to a short list of awardees including Reliance, Waaree, ReNew, First Solar India, Tata Power Solar, and Avaada. Disbursements are tied to commissioning milestones and to integration depth, with the largest payments reserved for fully integrated polysilicon to module lines.

The market is ring fenced through the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers, which restricts which modules can be used in government supported projects, and through basic customs duty of 40 percent on modules and 25 percent on cells. The combination has lifted Indian module manufacturing capacity from under 20 gigawatts in 2022 to an expected 110 gigawatts by end 2026, with cell capacity rising past 60 gigawatts. Domestic prices sit at a 70 to 120 percent premium to Chinese ex works levels, a gap that is politically tolerable while developer returns remain healthy but that will be tested if power purchase agreement tariffs are renegotiated downward.

Three scenarios for 2026 to 2028 #

We frame the next three years around three scenarios that differ in the pace of Chinese capacity rationalization, the durability of US trade defense, and the credibility of Indian self sufficiency. Each carries distinct implications for module pricing, project economics, and trade flows.

The scenarios below are drawn from TradeWeave's integrated trade and capacity model and are intended as planning anchors rather than point forecasts.

ScenarioChina capacity exit by 2028US module ASP 2028 (USD/W)India module ASP 2028 (USD/W)Global installed demand 2028 (GW)
Prolonged glut150 GW0.300.20820
Managed rebalancing320 GW0.340.22880
Policy fragmentation240 GW0.400.24770
Table 2. Solar PV scenarios 2026 to 2028 (TradeWeave integrated capacity and trade model; ASP refers to average selling price for utility scale bifacial TOPCon modules, gross of 45X credit value where applicable).

What buyers, developers, and policymakers should do now #

For utility scale developers and corporate offtakers, the central question is no longer whether to buy domestic or imported modules, but how to construct a portfolio that captures the lowest available landed cost in each tariff bucket while preserving optionality on domestic content adders. Promethean's procurement playbook recommends locking in 18 to 24 month frame agreements with at least two qualified US assemblers, layering in Indonesian or Saudi assembled product for cost optimization, and reserving capacity at one Indian supplier to hedge against Asian regional policy shifts.

For manufacturers, the strategic imperative is to avoid being the marginal producer in any geography. That means accelerating polysilicon to module integration in the US to maximize 45X stack value, securing long term polysilicon supply outside Xinjiang for UFLPA compliance, and treating cell capacity as the binding constraint through at least 2027. For policymakers, the lesson of the last cycle is that tariff defense without domestic capacity creates rents for traders rather than industry, while domestic capacity without offtake mandates creates stranded assets. The architecture that works in 2026 to 2028 will combine production credits, content based demand pull, and trade enforcement that anticipates rather than chases circumvention. TradeWeave and Promethean stand ready to support that work with the trade analytics, scenario modeling, and procurement benchmarking that this market now demands.

Sources #

Cite this brief

@misc{hossen2026solarpvmanufacturing2026,
  author = {Hossen, Md Deluair},
  title  = {Solar PV Manufacturing 2026: China Oversupply, US Tariff Defense, India Capacity Ramp},
  year   = {2026},
  url    = {https://deluair.com/consultancy/insights/solar-pv-manufacturing-2026},
  note   = {Deluair Consultancy briefs}
}