Sahel coup belt 2026: AES sovereignty, Russian displacement of France, and the gold and uranium recoupling

The coup chronology and the AES confederation #

Six successful coups have realigned the West African political map between August 2020 and August 2023. Mali led the cycle with the August 18, 2020 ouster of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the May 24, 2021 second coup that consolidated Colonel Assimi Goita's transition presidency. Burkina Faso followed with Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Damiba's January 24, 2022 takeover, then Captain Ibrahim Traore's internal coup on September 30, 2022. Niger broke the trend line on July 26, 2023, when General Abdourahamane Tchiani's presidential guard detained Mohamed Bazoum, the last French aligned civilian president in the inland Sahel. Gabon's August 30, 2023 coup, led by General Brice Oligui Nguema against Ali Bongo, sits outside the Sahel security theater but reinforced the regional perception that French security guarantees no longer hold.

The Alliance of Sahel States was signed in Bamako on September 16, 2023, originally as a mutual defense charter (the Liptako Gourma Charter), then upgraded to a confederation at the Niamey summit on July 6, 2024. The three juntas notified ECOWAS of their joint withdrawal on January 28, 2024, and the exit became effective on January 29, 2025, after the one year notice period under Article 91 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty. ECOWAS lifted financial and trade sanctions on Niger in February 2024 in an unsuccessful attempt to keep the bloc intact. The AES has since announced a common biometric passport, a planned investment bank, and a 5,000 troop joint force, although deployment was still pending as of early 2026 per ICG.

Russian Africa Corps replaces France and the United States #

France's Operation Barkhane, launched in 2014 with up to 5,500 troops at peak, formally ended in Mali on August 15, 2022. Burkina Faso terminated the 2018 defense agreement in January 2023, and the residual French Sabre special forces left Kamboinsin in February 2023. The 1,500 strong French contingent in Niger withdrew by December 22, 2023. Chad ended its defense cooperation agreement on November 28, 2024, and Senegal's President Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced in November 2024 that all French bases would close in 2025. The US redeployment out of Niger Air Base 201 in Agadez completed September 15, 2024 per AFRICOM, backstopped by rotational deployments in Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, and Ghana, although none host a permanent drone base on the Agadez scale.

Russia has filled the vacuum through the Africa Corps, the post August 23, 2023 reorganization of Wagner under GRU oversight after Yevgeny Prigozhin's plane crash. Open source tracking by RUSI, ISW, and All Eyes on Wagner places approximately 1,500 Russian personnel in Mali (heir to the Wagner contingent that arrived December 2021), 300 in Burkina Faso (deployed January 2024), and 200 in Niger (April 2024). The July 25 to 27, 2024 Tinzaouaten engagement, where a Tuareg coalition allied with JNIM killed roughly 50 Wagner fighters and 47 FAMa soldiers per CNN and Le Monde, exposed the limits of Russian counter insurgency and the resilience of the Azawad rebellion. Mali abrogated the Algiers Accords on January 25, 2024, removing the legal framework that had constrained northern operations since 2015.

The conflict economy: JNIM, ISGS, and 30,000 deaths in 2024 #

ACLED's 2024 Sahel data, published in January 2025, recorded approximately 30,000 conflict related fatalities across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the highest national totals globally and a roughly 25 percent increase over 2023. Burkina Faso alone accounted for over 14,000 deaths, with Jama'at Nasr al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM, the al Qaeda affiliated coalition led by Iyad Ag Ghali) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISGS) the dominant armed actors. The two groups have a non aggression coexistence in some zones but contest the Liptako Gourma tri border area. UN OCHA reported 8.4 million people in need across the central Sahel in 2024, with 3.2 million internally displaced (Burkina Faso 2.1 million, Mali 0.4 million, Niger 0.7 million per IOM DTM). The 2025 humanitarian appeal for the three countries totaled USD 2.7 billion against confirmed funding of roughly 28 percent at midyear, the lowest coverage ratio of any major humanitarian theater per OCHA Financial Tracking Service.

The state response is increasingly kinetic and ethnically coded. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN Panel of Experts on Mali have documented mass civilian casualty events involving FAMa and Russian forces (Moura, March 2022, 500 reported civilian deaths) and VDP auxiliaries in Burkina Faso (Karma, April 2023; Solenzo and Kongoussi clusters, 2024). ICG estimates that the Mali state effectively controls less than 50 percent of national territory in 2026, Burkina Faso roughly 60 percent, and Niger around 75 percent. The September 17, 2024 Bamako attack, claimed by JNIM, struck the gendarmerie school and Modibo Keita airport, the deepest urban penetration since the 2015 Radisson Blu attack.

Mali gold: Barrick, Resolute, and the USD 5.5 billion tax reset #

Mali's 2023 mining code, promulgated August 29, 2023 and applied retroactively, raised the state's free carried interest to 10 percent, allowed an additional 20 percent paid participation, increased royalties from 6 to 10.5 percent depending on the gold price, and removed several long standing tax stabilization clauses. The flagship dispute concerns Barrick's Loulo Gounkoto complex, Mali's largest single gold producer at 723,000 ounces in 2024 per Barrick's Q4 2024 results. Mali detained four Barrick employees in September 2024, blocked gold exports from January 11, 2025 onward, and demanded approximately USD 5.5 to 6 billion in claimed back taxes and royalties. Barrick filed for ICSID arbitration on December 12, 2024, suspended operations in January 2025, and signed a memorandum of understanding with Bamako in February 2025 that contemplates a USD 438 million settlement plus a future revenue sharing recalibration, although operational restart had not been confirmed at the time of writing per the company's Q1 2025 disclosures.

Resolute Mining is the second precedent. CEO Terence Holohan and two senior staff were detained in Bamako on November 8, 2024 and released approximately ten days later after Resolute committed USD 160 million in payments and accepted a revised Syama convention (315,000 ounces in 2024). B2Gold's Fekola (598,000 ounces in 2024) signed a new convention in September 2023 that ceded the Fekola Regional satellite deposits at a 35 percent state stake. Allied Gold's Sadiola produced 211,000 ounces in 2024 with Phase 2 expansion conditional on tax clarity. Gold accounts for roughly 25 percent of Mali's GDP and over 80 percent of merchandise exports per IMF Article IV Aug 2023, and the junta's fiscal model now depends on cash extracted from foreign miners rather than multilateral disbursements frozen since the 2022 ECOWAS sanctions.

Niger uranium: Orano squeezed, China and Russia in the queue #

Niger was the world's seventh largest uranium producer in 2022 at approximately 2,020 tonnes U, supplying around 4.7 percent of global mine output per World Nuclear Association and roughly 24 percent of EU natural uranium imports per the Euratom Supply Agency 2022 report. The asset base centers on three Orano operations: Somair (Arlit, operational since 1971), Cominak (closed March 31, 2021 after 43 years), and Imouraren (the world's second largest deposit by reserves at approximately 200,000 tonnes U, undeveloped). On June 20, 2024 the Tchiani government revoked Orano's Imouraren permit. Somair operations were suspended in October 2024, and Orano announced on December 4, 2024 that it had lost operational control of Somair and Cominak. Orano filed ICSID arbitration in December 2024 and a Paris commercial arbitration in February 2025. Cumulative impairment on Niger assets reached approximately EUR 760 million in 2024 results.

Niamey has signaled that the displaced tonnage will be redirected through Rosatom and Chinese SOEs (CNNC and CGN). Rosatom announced in November 2024 a memorandum of understanding for uranium offtake and a feasibility study on a small modular reactor, and CNNC's Azelik (suspended since 2014) was tabled for restart at the AES investment forum in March 2025. The European utility response has been diversification toward Kazakhstan (Kazatomprom held roughly 43 percent of global mine output in 2024), Canada (Cameco's Cigar Lake at 18 million pounds U3O8 in 2024), and Australia. The spot uranium price moved from roughly USD 50 per pound at the July 2023 coup to a peak of USD 106 in February 2024, with U3O8 trading near USD 78 per pound in March 2026 per UxC. Niger displacement is one component of that price reset, alongside Cameco production guidance and the Russian enrichment ban signed into US law on May 13, 2024.

Recommendations for miners, sovereign creditors, donors, and multinationals #

For mining companies, the 2026 to 2028 operating assumption should be a renegotiated convention at a 35 percent state participation threshold, royalties of 7 to 10.5 percent on a sliding scale, removal of tax stabilization, and credible threats of executive detention as a leverage instrument. The Barrick and Resolute precedents suggest that a settle and resume strategy, with a defined cash settlement and a revised production sharing arithmetic, is the path that returns operations to cash flow fastest. ICSID filings remain a useful hedge, but enforcement against state owned mining assets has historically been slow and partial. Boards should reweight country risk premia by 400 to 600 basis points for Mali and Burkina Faso and model a six to twelve month export blockage scenario.

For sovereign creditors, the AES exit from ECOWAS removes the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) regional bond market backstop, although the three remain inside the CFA franc zone for now. UEMOA deliberated in February 2025 on whether to continue accepting AES sovereign issuance. Mali's eurobond curve trades at distressed levels with limited secondary liquidity. The IMF Extended Credit Facility for Niger has been suspended since July 2023, and Burkina Faso's program engagement is paused. Donors should plan for a structurally lower aid envelope through 2028, with humanitarian channels routed through OCHA pooled funds, ICRC, and MSF rather than bilateral budget support.

For multinationals, second order effects matter: the closure of overland trade with Benin (partially reopened in 2024), the diversion of Niger uranium from European utilities, the reduction in French commercial presence (Orange, Bollore, TotalEnergies all under pressure), and the Russian and Turkish replacement of European logistics providers create a fragmented operating environment. Cocoa and coffee flows through Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana have absorbed a measurable share of cross border informal trade displaced from the AES corridor. The two scenarios that warrant explicit board level discussion in 2026 are an AES common currency exit from the CFA franc, repeatedly trailed by Bamako and Niamey, and a contested transition election in either Mali or Burkina Faso, both of which the juntas have postponed beyond their original 2024 commitments.

Sources #

• ACLED, Sahel Conflict Data 2024 Annual Report
• International Crisis Group, Sahel briefings and Q1 2026 update
• UN OCHA, Central Sahel Humanitarian Response Plan 2025
• ECOWAS Commission, communique on AES withdrawal, January 29, 2025
• Barrick Gold, Q4 2024 and Q1 2025 results, Loulo Gounkoto disclosure
• Resolute Mining, Bamako detention announcement, November 2024
• B2Gold Corp, Fekola Q4 2024 production release
• Allied Gold Corp, Sadiola operations report 2024
• Orano, communique on Niger Imouraren license revocation, June 21, 2024
• Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2022 and 2023
• World Nuclear Association, World Uranium Mining Production 2024
• USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025, gold and uranium chapters
• IMF Article IV consultation, Mali 2023
• IMF Article IV consultation, Burkina Faso 2024
• World Bank, Sahel Country Economic Memoranda
• AFRICOM, Niger Air Base 201 redeployment statement, September 2024
• RUSI, Russia in Africa research program
• Institute for the Study of War, Africa File
• Reuters, Sahel coverage 2023 to 2026
• Le Monde Afrique, AES and mining coverage
• RFI, Sahel reporting
• Jeune Afrique, AES and Africa Corps coverage
• African Development Bank, West Africa Economic Outlook 2025
• UxC and TradeTech, uranium spot price assessments March 2026